Is Psychology a Science?
By Sam Vaknin
Author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited"

All theories - scientific or not - start with a problem. They aim to
solve it by proving that what appears to be "problematic" is not.
They re-state the conundrum, or introduce new data, new variables, a
new classification, or new organizing principles. They incorporate
the problem in a larger body of knowledge, or in a conjecture
("solution"). They explain why we thought we had an issue on our
hands - and how it can be avoided, vitiated, or resolved.

Scientific theories invite constant criticism and revision. They
yield new problems. They are proven erroneous and are replaced by
new models which offer better explanations and a more profound sense
of understanding - often by solving these new problems. From time to
time, the successor theories constitute a break with everything
known and done till then. These seismic convulsions are known
as "paradigm shifts".

Contrary to widespread opinion - even among scientists - science is
not only about "facts". It is not merely about quantifying,
measuring, describing, classifying, and organizing "things"
(entities). It is not even concerned with finding out the "truth".
Science is about providing us with concepts, explanations, and
predictions (collectively known as "theories") and thus endowing us
with a sense of understanding of our world.

Scientific theories are allegorical or metaphoric. They revolve
around symbols and theoretical constructs, concepts and substantive
assumptions, axioms and hypotheses - most of which can never, even
in principle, be computed, observed, quantified, measured, or
correlated with the world "out there". By appealing to our
imagination, scientific theories reveal what David Deutsch
calls "the fabric of reality".

Like any other system of knowledge, science has its fanatics,
heretics, and deviants.

Instrumentalists, for instance, insist that scientific theories
should be concerned exclusively with predicting the outcomes of
appropriately designed experiments. Their explanatory powers are of
no consequence. Positivists ascribe meaning only to statements that
deal with observables and observations.

Instrumentalists and positivists ignore the fact that predictions
are derived from models, narratives, and organizing principles. In
short: it is the theory's explanatory dimensions that determine
which experiments are relevant and which are not. Forecasts - and
experiments - that are not embedded in an understanding of the world
(in an explanation) do not constitute science.

Granted, predictions and experiments are crucial to the growth of
scientific knowledge and the winnowing out of erroneous or
inadequate theories. But they are not the only mechanisms of natural
selection. There are other criteria that help us decide whether to
adopt and place confidence in a scientific theory or not. Is the
theory aesthetic (parsimonious), logical, does it provide a
reasonable explanation and, thus, does it further our understanding
of the world?

David Deutsch in "The Fabric of Reality" (p. 11):

"... (I)t is hard to give a precise definition of 'explanation'
or 'understanding'. Roughly speaking, they are about 'why' rather
than 'what'; about the inner workings of things; about how things
really are, not just how they appear to be; about what must be so,
rather than what merely happens to be so; about laws of nature
rather than rules of thumb. They are also about coherence, elegance,
and simplicity, as opposed to arbitrariness and complexity ..."

Reductionists and emergentists ignore the existence of a hierarchy
of scientific theories and meta-languages. They believe - and it is
an article of faith, not of science - that complex phenomena (such
as the human mind) can be reduced to simple ones (such as the
physics and chemistry of the brain). Furthermore, to them the act of
reduction is, in itself, an explanation and a form of pertinent
understanding. Human thought, fantasy, imagination, and emotions are
nothing but electric currents and spurts of chemicals in the brain,
they say.

Holists, on the other hand, refuse to consider the possibility that
some higher-level phenomena can, indeed, be fully reduced to base
components and primitive interactions. They ignore the fact that
reductionism sometimes does provide explanations and understanding.
The properties of water, for instance, do spring forth from its
chemical and physical composition and from the interactions between
its constituent atoms and subatomic particles.

Still, there is a general agreement that scientific theories must be
abstract (independent of specific time or place), intersubjectively
explicit (contain detailed descriptions of the subject matter in
unambiguous terms), logically rigorous (make use of logical systems
shared and accepted by the practitioners in the field), empirically
relevant (correspond to results of empirical research), useful (in
describing and/or explaining the world), and provide typologies and
predictions.

A scientific theory should resort to primitive (atomic) terminology
and all its complex (derived) terms and concepts should be defined
in these indivisible terms. It should offer a map unequivocally and
consistently connecting operational definitions to theoretical
concepts.

Operational definitions that connect to the same theoretical concept
should not contradict each other (be negatively correlated). They
should yield agreement on measurement conducted independently by
trained experimenters. But investigation of the theory of its
implication can proceed even without quantification.

Theoretical concepts need not necessarily be measurable or
quantifiable or observable. But a scientific theory should afford at
least four levels of quantification of its operational and
theoretical definitions of concepts: nominal (labeling), ordinal
(ranking), interval and ratio.

As we said, scientific theories are not confined to quantified
definitions or to a classificatory apparatus. To qualify as
scientific they must contain statements about relationships (mostly
causal) between concepts - empirically-supported laws and/or
propositions (statements derived from axioms).

Philosophers like Carl Hempel and Ernest Nagel regard a theory as
scientific if it is hypothetico-deductive. To them, scientific
theories are sets of inter-related laws. We know that they are inter-
related because a minimum number of axioms and hypotheses yield, in
an inexorable deductive sequence, everything else known in the field
the theory pertains to.

Explanation is about retrodiction - using the laws to show how
things happened. Prediction is using the laws to show how things
will happen. Understanding is explanation and prediction combined.

William Whewell augmented this somewhat simplistic point of view
with his principle of "consilience of inductions". Often, he
observed, inductive explanations of disparate phenomena are
unexpectedly traced to one underlying cause. This is what scientific
theorizing is about - finding the common source of the apparently
separate.

This omnipotent view of the scientific endeavor competes with a more
modest, semantic school of philosophy of science.

Many theories - especially ones with breadth, width, and profundity,
such as Darwin's theory of evolution - are not deductively
integrated and are very difficult to test (falsify) conclusively.
Their predictions are either scant or ambiguous.

Scientific theories, goes the semantic view, are amalgams of models
of reality. These are empirically meaningful only inasmuch as they
are empirically (directly and therefore semantically) applicable to
a limited area. A typical scientific theory is not constructed with
explanatory and predictive aims in mind. Quite the opposite: the
choice of models incorporated in it dictates its ultimate success in
explaining the Universe and predicting the outcomes of experiments.

Are psychological theories scientific theories by any definition
(prescriptive or descriptive)? Hardly.

First, we must distinguish between psychological theories and the
way that some of them are applied (psychotherapy and psychological
plots). Psychological plots are the narratives co-authored by the
therapist and the patient during psychotherapy. These narratives are
the outcomes of applying psychological theories and models to the
patient's specific circumstances.

Psychological plots amount to storytelling - but they are still
instances of the psychological theories used. The instances of
theoretical concepts in concrete situations form part of every
theory. Actually, the only way to test psychological theories - with
their dearth of measurable entities and concepts - is by examining
such instances (plots).

Storytelling has been with us since the days of campfire and
besieging wild animals. It serves a number of important functions:
amelioration of fears, communication of vital information (regarding
survival tactics and the characteristics of animals, for instance),
the satisfaction of a sense of order (predictability and justice),
the development of the ability to hypothesize, predict and introduce
new or additional theories and so on.

We are all endowed with a sense of wonder. The world around us in
inexplicable, baffling in its diversity and myriad forms. We
experience an urge to organize it, to "explain the wonder away", to
order it so that we know what to expect next (predict). These are
the essentials of survival. But while we have been successful at
imposing our mind on the outside world - we have been much less
successful when we tried to explain and comprehend our internal
universe and our behavior.

Psychology is not an exact science, nor can it ever be. This is
because its "raw material" (humans and their behavior as individuals
and en masse) is not exact. It will never yield natural laws or
universal constants (like in physics). Experimentation in the field
is constrained by legal and ethical rules. Humans tend to be
opinionated, develop resistance, and become self-conscious when
observed.

The relationship between the structure and functioning of our
(ephemeral) mind, the structure and modes of operation of our
(physical) brain, and the structure and conduct of the outside world
have been a matter for heated debate for millennia.

Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought:

One camp identify the substrate (brain) with its product (mind).
Some of these scholars postulate the existence of a lattice of
preconceived, born, categorical knowledge about the universe - the
vessels into which we pour our experience and which mould it.

Others within this group regard the mind as a black box. While it is
possible in principle to know its input and output, it is
impossible, again in principle, to understand its internal
functioning and management of information. To describe this input-
output mechanism, Pavlov coined the word "conditioning", Watson
adopted it and invented "behaviorism", Skinner came up
with "reinforcement".

Epiphenomenologists (proponents of theories of emergent phenomena)
regard the mind as the by-product of the complexity of the
brain's "hardware" and "wiring". But all of them ignore the
psychophysical question: what IS the mind and HOW is it linked to
the brain?

The other camp assumes the airs of "scientific" and "positivist"
thinking. It speculates that the mind (whether a physical entity, an
epiphenomenon, a non-physical principle of organization, or the
result of introspection) has a structure and a limited set of
functions. It is argued that a "mind owner's manual" could be
composed, replete with engineering and maintenance instructions. It
proffers a dynamics of the psyche.

The most prominent of these "psychodynamists" was, of course, Freud.
Though his disciples (Adler, Horney, the object-relations lot)
diverged wildly from his initial theories, they all shared his
belief in the need to "scientify" and objectify psychology.

Freud, a medical doctor by profession (neurologist) - preceded by
another M.D., Josef Breuer - put forth a theory regarding the
structure of the mind and its mechanics: (suppressed) energies and
(reactive) forces. Flow charts were provided together with a method
of analysis, a mathematical physics of the mind.

Many hold all psychodynamic theories to be a mirage. An essential
part is missing, they observe: the ability to test the hypotheses,
which derive from these "theories". Though very convincing and,
surprisingly, possessed of great explanatory powers, being non-
verifiable and non-falsifiable as they are - psychodynamic models of
the mind cannot be deemed to possess the redeeming features of
scientific theories.

Deciding between the two camps was and is a crucial matter. Consider
the clash - however repressed - between psychiatry and psychology.
The former regards "mental disorders" as euphemisms - it
acknowledges only the reality of brain dysfunctions (such as
biochemical or electric imbalances) and of hereditary factors. The
latter (psychology) implicitly assumes that something exists
(the "mind", the "psyche") which cannot be reduced to hardware or to
wiring diagrams. Talk therapy is aimed at that something and
supposedly interacts with it.

But perhaps the distinction is artificial. Perhaps the mind is
simply the way we experience our brains. Endowed with the gift (or
curse) of introspection, we experience a duality, a split,
constantly being both observer and observed. Moreover, talk therapy
involves TALKING - which is the transfer of energy from one brain to
another through the air. This is a directed, specifically formed
energy, intended to trigger certain circuits in the recipient brain.
It should come as no surprise if it were to be discovered that talk
therapy has clear physiological effects upon the brain of the
patient (blood volume, electrical activity, discharge and absorption
of hormones, etc.).

All this would be doubly true if the mind were, indeed, only an
emergent phenomenon of the complex brain - two sides of the same
coin.

Psychological theories of the mind are metaphors of the mind. They
are fables and myths, narratives, stories, hypotheses, conjunctures.
They play (exceedingly) important roles in the psychotherapeutic
setting - but not in the laboratory. Their form is artistic, not
rigorous, not testable, less structured than theories in the natural
sciences. The language used is polyvalent, rich, effusive,
ambiguous, evocative, and fuzzy - in short, metaphorical. These
theories are suffused with value judgments, preferences, fears, post
facto and ad hoc constructions. None of this has methodological,
systematic, analytic and predictive merits.

Still, the theories in psychology are powerful instruments,
admirable constructs, and they satisfy important needs to explain
and understand ourselves, our interactions with others, and with our
environment.

The attainment of peace of mind is a need, which was neglected by
Maslow in his famous hierarchy. People sometimes sacrifice material
wealth and welfare, resist temptations, forgo opportunities, and
risk their lives - in order to secure it. There is, in other words,
a preference of inner equilibrium over homeostasis. It is the
fulfillment of this overwhelming need that psychological theories
cater to. In this, they are no different to other collective
narratives (myths, for instance).

Still, psychology is desperately trying to maintain contact with
reality and to be thought of as a scientific discipline. It employs
observation and measurement and organizes the results, often
presenting them in the language of mathematics. In some quarters,
these practices lends it an air of credibility and rigorousness.
Others snidely regard the as an elaborate camouflage and a sham.
Psychology, they insist, is a pseudo-science. It has the trappings
of science but not its substance.

Worse still, while historical narratives are rigid and immutable,
the application of psychological theories (in the form of
psychotherapy) is "tailored" and "customized" to the circumstances
of each and every patient (client). The user or consumer is
incorporated in the resulting narrative as the main hero (or anti-
hero). This flexible "production line" seems to be the result of an
age of increasing individualism.

True, the "language units" (large chunks of denotates and
connotates) used in psychology and psychotherapy are one and the
same, regardless of the identity of the patient and his therapist.
In psychoanalysis, the analyst is likely to always employ the
tripartite structure (Id, Ego, Superego). But these are merely the
language elements and need not be confused with the idiosyncratic
plots that are weaved in every encounter. Each client, each person,
and his own, unique, irreplicable, plot.

To qualify as a "psychological" (both meaningful and instrumental)
plot, the narrative, offered to the patient by the therapist, must
be:

1.. All-inclusive (anamnetic) - It must encompass, integrate and
incorporate all the facts known about the protagonist.
2.. Coherent - It must be chronological, structured and causal.
3.. Consistent - Self-consistent (its subplots cannot contradict
one another or go against the grain of the main plot) and consistent
with the observed phenomena (both those related to the protagonist
and those pertaining to the rest of the universe).
4.. Logically compatible - It must not violate the laws of logic
both internally (the plot must abide by some internally imposed
logic) and externally (the Aristotelian logic which is applicable to
the observable world).
5.. Insightful (diagnostic) - It must inspire in the client a
sense of awe and astonishment which is the result of seeing
something familiar in a new light or the result of seeing a pattern
emerging out of a big body of data. The insights must constitute the
inevitable conclusion of the logic, the language, and of the
unfolding of the plot.
6.. Aesthetic - The plot must be both plausible and "right",
beautiful, not cumbersome, not awkward, not discontinuous, smooth,
parsimonious, simple, and so on.
7.. Parsimonious - The plot must employ the minimum numbers of
assumptions and entities in order to satisfy all the above
conditions.
8.. Explanatory - The plot must explain the behavior of other
characters in the plot, the hero's decisions and behavior, why
events developed the way they did.
9.. Predictive (prognostic) - The plot must possess the ability to
predict future events, the future behavior of the hero and of other
meaningful figures and the inner emotional and cognitive dynamics.
10.. Therapeutic - With the power to induce change, encourage
functionality, make the patient happier and more content with
himself (ego-syntony), with others, and with his circumstances.
11.. Imposing - The plot must be regarded by the client as the
preferable organizing principle of his life's events and a torch to
guide him in the dark (vade mecum).
12.. Elastic - The plot must possess the intrinsic abilities to
self organize, reorganize, give room to emerging order, accommodate
new data comfortably, and react flexibly to attacks from within and
from without.
In all these respects, a psychological plot is a theory in disguise.
Scientific theories satisfy most of the above conditions as well.
But this apparent identity is flawed. The important elements of
testability, verifiability, refutability, falsifiability, and
repeatability - are all largely missing from psychological theories
and plots. No experiment could be designed to test the statements
within the plot, to establish their truth-value and, thus, to
convert them to theorems or hypotheses in a theory.

There are four reasons to account for this inability to test and
prove (or falsify) psychological theories:

1.. Ethical - Experiments would have to be conducted, involving
the patient and others. To achieve the necessary result, the
subjects will have to be ignorant of the reasons for the experiments
and their aims. Sometimes even the very performance of an experiment
will have to remain a secret (double blind experiments). Some
experiments may involve unpleasant or even traumatic experiences.
This is ethically unacceptable.
2.. The Psychological Uncertainty Principle - The initial state of
a human subject in an experiment is usually fully established. But
both treatment and experimentation influence the subject and render
this knowledge irrelevant. The very processes of measurement and
observation influence the human subject and transform him or her -
as do life's circumstances and vicissitudes.
3.. Uniqueness - Psychological experiments are, therefore, bound
to be unique, unrepeatable, cannot be replicated elsewhere and at
other times even when they are conducted with the SAME subjects.
This is because the subjects are never the same due to the
aforementioned psychological uncertainty principle. Repeating the
experiments with other subjects adversely affects the scientific
value of the results.
4.. The undergeneration of testable hypotheses - Psychology does
not generate a sufficient number of hypotheses, which can be
subjected to scientific testing. This has to do with the fabulous
(=storytelling) nature of psychology. In a way, psychology has
affinity with some private languages. It is a form of art and, as
such, is self-sufficient and self-contained. If structural, internal
constraints are met - a statement is deemed true even if it does not
satisfy external scientific requirements.
So, what are psychological theories and plots good for? They are the
instruments used in the procedures which induce peace of mind (even
happiness) in the client. This is done with the help of a few
embedded mechanisms:

1.. The Organizing Principle - Psychological plots offer the
client an organizing principle, a sense of order, meaningfulness,
and justice, an inexorable drive toward well defined (though,
perhaps, hidden) goals, the feeling of being part of a whole. They
strive to answer the "why's" and "how's" of life. They are dialogic.
The client asks: "why am I (suffering from a syndrome) and how (can
I successfully tackle it)". Then, the plot is spun: "you are like
this not because the world is whimsically cruel but because your
parents mistreated you when you were very young, or because a person
important to you died, or was taken away from you when you were
still impressionable, or because you were sexually abused and so
on". The client is becalmed by the very fact that there is an
explanation to that which until now monstrously taunted and haunted
him, that he is not the plaything of vicious Gods, that there is a
culprit (focusing his diffuse anger). His belief in the existence of
order and justice and their administration by some supreme,
transcendental principle is restored. This sense of "law and order"
is further enhanced when the plot yields predictions which come true
(either because they are self-fulfilling or because some real,
underlying "law" has been discovered).

2.. The Integrative Principle - The client is offered, through the
plot, access to the innermost, hitherto inaccessible, recesses of
his mind. He feels that he is being reintegrated, that "things fall
into place". In psychodynamic terms, the energy is released to do
productive and positive work, rather than to induce distorted and
destructive forces.

3.. The Purgatory Principle - In most cases, the client feels
sinful, debased, inhuman, decrepit, corrupting, guilty, punishable,
hateful, alienated, strange, mocked and so on. The plot offers him
absolution. The client's suffering expurgates, cleanses, absolves,
and atones for his sins and handicaps. A feeling of hard won
achievement accompanies a successful plot. The client sheds layers
of functional, adaptive stratagems rendered dysfunctional and
maladaptive. This is inordinately painful. The client feels
dangerously naked, precariously exposed. He then assimilates the
plot offered to him, thus enjoying the benefits emanating from the
previous two principles and only then does he develop new mechanisms
of coping. Therapy is a mental crucifixion and resurrection and
atonement for the patient's sins. It is a religious experience.
Psychological theories and plots are in the role of the scriptures
from which solace and consolation can be always gleaned.